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 A Journey ol a Thousand Steps
 The Challenges of State and Nation Building in South Sudan
 Manie-Joëlle Zahar
 On pendent. referendum July 9, When 20II, on independence, South southern Sudan Sudanese will they officially voted sought in to become the affirm January their inde- 9
 pendent. When southern Sudanese voted in the January 9
 referendum on independence, they sought to affirm their
 African identity and shed the Arab identity that they felt had
 been imposed upon them by successive regimes in Khartoum.
 They also signaled their desire to be masters of their own destiny,
 displaying their lack of trust in the norths ability to meet their
 demands for fair sharing of wealth and power. But Africa's newest
 state will continue to share characteristics with the "old" Sudan
 that, if they are not addressed, bode ill for its prospects of a
 peaceful, democratic future. Much like northern Sudan, South
 Sudan will face three key challenges: diversity, democratic gover-
 nance and security threats. In spite of its symbolic importance,
 the July 9 independence date marks not an end but a beginning
 on the arduous road of state and nation building.
 Diversity
 "At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a
 geographical expression."1 This assessment by Jok Madut
 Marie-Joëlle Zahar is associate professor of political science at the Université de Montréal.
 Jok, undersecretary in the Government of Southern Sudan's
 Ministry of Culture and Heritage, speaks to the challenge
 ahead. With over 70 cultural and linguistic groups, South
 Sudan is as internally diverse as the whole of Sudan before
 separation. Its history is rife with inter- and intra-group conflict
 that has cost many lives during the 22-year war with the north,
 the implementation period of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
 Agreement and the lead-up to independence.
 South Sudan's internal violence is often described as tribal.
 Meted out by young men with easy access to small arms and
 light weapons, the violence is most intense in "drought-prone
 areas with a scarcity of water and land," underscoring the
 extent to which tribalism is in fact a political tool used to rally
 support and strengthen the claims of some at the expense of
 others.2 Tribal tensions are exacerbated by the perception that
 the Dinka tribe dominated the Sudan People's Liberation
 Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that fought Khartoum and that
 they thus dominate the Government of Southern Sudan with
 which Khartoum signed the peace deal. In Western Bahr
 al-Ghazal state, for example, Ndogo elders link the behavior of
 Dinka cattle keepers who have stopped asking for permission
 to graze on Ndogo lands to the predominance of the S PLA.3
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 This distrust is echoed in the findings of National Democratic
 Institute focus group research in which southerners express
 strong concerns about corruption, ethnicity-based hiring and
 nepotism in the post-referendum government. Summing up
 these concerns, a Madi woman described the biggest post-
 referendum challenge as "the threat of Dinka marginalizing
 the other tribes in Southern Sudan."4
 One of the most serious conflicts - which erupted in
 violence in January 2009 in the town of Malakal - pits the
 Shilluk against the Dinka. Rooted in different memories of
 the borders that separated the two communities before 1956,
 when the contemporary map of the country used in the peace
 deal was drawn up, the conflict is overlain with a number of
 political tensions. The Shilluk mostly sat on the "political
 and strategic fence" during the north-south conflict; Fashoda
 county, the heart of the Shilluk domain, was not an SPLM
 stronghold, but was controlled by Khartoum's forces for most
 of the war. Furthermore, the Shilluk area is home to Lam
 Akol, architect of a split within the SPLM in 1991, subsequent
 affiliate of Khartoum and recent founder of the political party
 SPLM-Democratic Change.5 The Shilluk feel a strong sense of
 marginalization as a result. They claim that they are being made
 to pay for their political choices and offer the underdevelop-
 ment of Kodok, the headquarters of Fashoda county, as proof.
 Internal violence is also attributed to the machinations of
 the Khartoum government. Many southerners believe that
 the norths ruling National Congress Party (NCP), though it
 has formally accepted the results of the referendum and says
 it intends to respect them, has not given up on its attempts to
 destabilize South Sudan. For example, Khartoum is regularly
 accused of flying in arms and cash to the troops of rebel
 commander Gen. George Athor, whose forces operate in the
 southern states of Jonglei and Upper Nile. Athor broke ranks
 with the SPLM in 2010 over dashed hopes of being nominated
 on the party slate in the April 2010 parliamentary elections.
 Such accusations sound particularly convincing in May 2011 as
 northern troops have taken over the disputed region of Abyei,
 set fire to the eponymous town and looted the property of its
 mainly Dinka inhabitants.
 South Sudan's social fabric is as diverse as it is fractious.
 While the various southern tribes and political forces joined
 together to fight the north, the unity of purpose that papered
 over differences is fraying at the edges. Building the nation
 will therefore be essential for southern Sudanese to move
 forward. There are few signs, however, that nation building is
 a priority for the governing SPLM. To date, such efforts have
 been limited and easily reversed, as the fate of the "south-south
 dialogue" attests.
 The notion of a south-south dialogue dates to an April 2005
 meeting of southern political, military and civil society leaders
 in Nairobi. This meeting resulted in the Covenant of the People
 of South Sudan, a document that committed the signatories
 to work hand in hand to unite southerners of all stripes in
 working for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
 Agreement.6 In 2008, the SPLM agreed to revive the "south-
 south dialogue" following the formation of the All Southern
 Sudan Political Parties Conference, an umbrella group of
 smaller political forces. Intended to address tribalism, corrup-
 tion and insecurity, the meeting also stressed the need for unity
 of purpose among the people of South Sudan.
 Though laudable, the efforts were short-lived. In the
 words of one observer, the SPLM has "largely attempted to
 remove - not harmonize - political differences and challenges
 to the ruling party, using military force, harassment and
 oppression."7 During the April 2010 elections, for instance,
 international observers reported a "high incidence of intimida-
 tion and the threat of the use of force" and "state interference
 in the campaigns of opposition candidates." According to the
 International Crisis Group, "arbitrary detention, strong-arming
 by the SPLM and direct interference in polling" contributed to
 widespread resentment.8 Efforts to mend fences were exerted,
 once again, ahead of the January 2011 referendum, with
 SPLM leader and Juba government head Salva Kiir granting
 amnesty to rebel commanders and holding a five-day all
 parties' conference in October. Since the referendum, however,
 the SPLM seems to have backed away from its commitment
 to consultation and inclusivity in decision-making. It has
 been particularly criticized for the way in which it formed
 the Technical Review Committee responsible for proposing
 amendments to the country's constitution in preparation for
 independence as well as for the preliminary recommendations
 of this SPLM-dominated committee, which has granted wider
 powers to the souths president in appointing and removing
 state governors. As Kiir serves as president, this move further
 centralizes power in the hands of the SPLM.
 In brief, there is little indication that meaningful dialogue is
 likely to happen in the short to medium term. Accommodating
 diversity seems to have been reduced to its most superficial
 political dimension, with parties rather than citizens the main
 target of government efforts. Furthermore, the government's
 track record does little to allay the fears of those who see in
 these limited nation building efforts an astute strategy for
 consolidating one-party rule.
 Governance
 According to one development firm's assessment, South Sudan
 faces "perhaps the greatest state-building challenge in the world
 today."9 Indeed, the new state starts from such a low baseline
 that it almost stands in a category of its own. With a total
 population of 8.26 million, 72 percent of whom are under the
 age of 30 and 51 percent of whom live below the poverty line,
 the new country's needs are immense. Only 27 percent of the
 adult population is literate.
 Experts further estimate that, beyond a core group of about
 50 senior officials, there is a "chronic shortage" of South Sudan
citizens capable of addressing these challenges. In recogni-
 tion of this state of affairs, the international community and
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 the nascent government in Juba have focused their energies
 on building institutions, including the central ministries,
 ten state governments and critical public administration
 functions. A report issued in 2010 estimated that "basic
 planning, budgeting and financial management systems are
 now in place. As a result of this and the increased security,
 provision of basic services has sharply increased, albeit from
 an extremely low base."10
 This meager capacity of the new state could cause a serious
 challenge to its legitimacy and authority. Most southern
 Sudanese consider that the period since 2005 has failed to
 deliver a "peace dividend." On the morrow of independence,
 citizens will want their state to "start acting like a govern-
 ment and a provider of services."11 National Democratic
 Institute focus group research has established that even the
 most contented of southerners, the Dinka of Northern Bahr
 al-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Lakes states, "are not fully satisfied
 with what the government has brought them."12 Participants
 want better performance from the state in building infrastruc-
 ture, providing tools for agriculture, controlling floods and
 supplying teachers, doctors and police. But the immensity
 of the task means that even the most competent and willing
 government will not be able to provide services as quickly as
 citizens desire. To illustrate the scope of the challenge, consider
 estimates that South Sudan needs to spend $7 billion to connect
 its main towns with roads when its entire 2009 budget was
 $1.44 billion.13
 Beyond the weakness of state institutions, two other
 difficulties are likely to stand in the way of the establishment
 of democratic institutions: centralization and the lack of a
 clear line between state and ruling party. In large and diverse
 countries, decentralization is acknowledged as the only viable
 path to accountable and representative government. In South
 Sudan, where people suffered for decades under the thumb
 of Khartoum, the diffusion of power is vital. In spite of the
 promise of the late SPLM leader John Garang to "bring the
 towns to the cities," the principles of decentralization and devo-
 lution have remained mostly ink on paper. Describing the state
 of affairs, the International Crisis Group states: "Government
 presence outside of Juba is concentrated mainly in state capitals,
 which are often small towns themselves where infrastructure
 and trained administrators are limited."14
 By its own admission, the government in Juba has not given
 priority to the twin objectives of decentralization and devolu-
 tion. The Local Government Act was voted into being only
 in 2009. The Act attempts to standardize local administrative
 bodies and provides for commissioners to be elected locally
 or, should elections not be possible, appointed by state gover-
 nors on an interim basis. In reality, the authority to appoint
 governors and sign off on selections of county commissioners
 has rested almost exclusively with the president. This power
 has been used as a vehicle for nepotism and is shaped by
 tribal calculations. The government in Juba has carved up
 South Sudan along tribal boundaries in another attempt to
 consolidate power. Such practices are detrimental to demo-
 cratic governance; they feed ethnic division, foster conflict over
 limited resources and entrench unaccountable power structures.
 More damaging to state legitimacy, these practices break one
 of the promises made to South Sudan's citizens. According to
 respondents in a youth focus group discussion in Upper Nile
 state: "Garang set up an initial system of caretakers. He made
 that arrangement to diffuse tribalism. When he died, the
 leadership broke Garang's arrangement."15
 Last, but not least, one of the failings of the Comprehensive
 Peace Agreement was to elevate the conflict between north
 and south over other struggles pitting Khartoum against the
 periphery, whether in Darfur or the Nuba Mountains. In so
 doing, the accord gave special status to both the ruling NCP
 and the SPLM. Some go so far as to argue that the agreement
 "inadvertently sowed the seeds for one-party rule."16 Indeed,
 not only did the peace deal give the SPLM partner status in
 the transitional unity government on par with the NCP, it
 also mandated 70 percent SPLM control of the executive
 and legislative branches at both central government and state
 levels. This state of affairs was intended to last only halfway
 through the interim period but delays in implementation
 meant that the SPLM managed to maintain control for most
 of the interim period.
 The blurred distinction between party and state is worrisome
 for its implications for multi-party politics in South Sudan, and
 for transparency and accountability as well. The opposition
 contends that the SPLM, as a "darling of the West," has siphoned
 off substantial US and other aid funds intended for state building
 efforts, pushing out technocrats unaffiliated with the party.17
 Concerns that the public purse may be used for private purposes
 were highlighted in 2008 when the disappearance of millions
 of Sudanese pounds of donor funding came to light. In 2009, a
 report prepared for USAID described the situation as follows:
 "The governments lax fiscal discipline, in part fueled by windfall
 oil revenues and large inflows of international aid, has resulted in
 some questionable financial irregularities and leakages, some sign
 of 'Dutch disease' and rising inflation. The government has gone
 on a consumption binge piling up arrears. A fiscal crisis emerged
 in early 2009." 18
 With concerns over its accountability at center stage, in June
 2009 the government made a verbal commitment to tackle
 corruption and appoint an auditor general in the Juba Compact,
 an agreement with the donor community. The South Sudan
 Anti-Corruption Commission was set up as an autonomous and
 impartial body in conformity with the law. The Commission
 was mandated, inter alia , to investigate cases of corruption and
 administrative malpractice with a view to protecting public
 as well as private property. It is noteworthy, however, that as
 ecently as late 2010, the southern press whirled with rumors of
 misuse of public funds involving very high-ranking members
 of the SPLM and government, including Vice President Riek
 Machar. Moreover, in its 2011 budget plan for the "accountability
 sector," Jubas finance ministry said it was unable to produce an
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 anti-corruption strategy due to lack of funds and "some lack of
 cooperation" from other government agencies.
 Last but not least, the fuzzy line between party and state
 exacerbates tensions over official appointments, which are often
 seen as no more than rewards for loyalty. A good example is
 the unofficial preference that county commissioners have a
 military background, preferably in the S PLA. Taken together
 with the redrawing of administrative divisions along tribal lines,
 this practice has turned many counties into de facto "ethnic
 fiefdoms," with predictable consequences for popular trust in
 government. In Upper Nile state, youth representatives told
 researchers, "County commissioners just think about their
 own safety and disregard the community."19
 Monopoly of Violence
 With the worst of the war with the north in the past, a survey
 undertaken in 2008 by the North-South Institute in collabora-
 tion with the Center for Peace and Development Studies at
 the University of Juba found that 77.2 percent of respondents
 recorded an overall improvement in security. Only 3.1 percent
 of respondents felt less secure than during the war. The survey
 noted, however, that 21.4 percent reported a decline in security
 over the three years since the signing of the Comprehensive
 Peace Agreement.20 The discrepancy points to the challenges
 that await independent South Sudan in establishing public
 safety and a uniform rule of law.
 One problem is the lawlessness of the rulers themselves. In
 spite of progress in transforming the SPLM into a civilian body,
 the party (and by extension the government) remains partly
 in the grip of a military culture that privileges the use of force.
 During the April 2010 parliamentary elections, monitors and
 agents of opposition parties complained that the SPLM called
 out its army to "create an atmosphere of intimidation." There
 were numerous reports of campaign workers for independent
 candidates being beaten outside polling stations.21 Juba has
 undertaken to transform the SPLA from a guerrilla force into
 a regular army, but observers point out that SPLA soldiers and
 officers, particularly those who have been decommissioned,
 continue to use army-issue weapons for personal enrichment,
 such as to grab land and steal cattle. The Southern Sudan Police
 Service is absorbing demobilized SPLA soldiers at a rapid clip,
 but they are scantly trained for their new duties, for which in
 any case they lack the equipment. Indeed, many of the 2008
 survey respondents saw the security forces as major sources of
 instability and human rights abuses.22
 South Sudan may face external threats as well. The disputed
 region of Abyei is once again aflame. Pressed by the interna-
 tional community to back down, President Omar al-Bashir in
 Khartoum has been defiant, claiming that the area belongs to the
 north, as his government did when it rejected the demarcation
 of the border by the Abyei Boundary Commission. The battle
 over Abyei raises fears for the entirety of the border between the
 two Sudans, north and south. The borderlands are the source of
 livelihood for many communities, including northern pastoralists
 who depend on access to pastures located in the south. Adding
 to fears is the tension in the two border states of Blue Nile and
 Southern Kordofan, which, although they were awarded to the
 north by the 2005 accord, were given special status and mandated
 to hold popular consultations to evaluate citizens' satisfaction with
 the relationship to Khartoum. The populations of Blue Nile and
 South Kordofan include a substantial number of SPLM members
 and SPLA fighters who have not yet been demobilized.
 Although the July 9 declaration of independence will mark
 the culmination of a long struggle for South Sudan, it is also
 likely to usher in a journey of a thousand steps in difficult
 terrain. The new polity must construct a national identity
 that accommodates the diversity of its citizens and moves
 beyond their one common yearning to be free of Khartoum's
 yoke. It must lay the foundations for democratic governance.
 Last but not least, if South Sudan wants to counter naysayers
 who claim it has the makings of a failed state, it will have
 to show willingness to protect its citizens from internal and
 external threats. All of this is a tall order, to say the least.
 And while the renewed violence in Abyei might give the
 government of South Sudan leeway as citizens rally around
 the flag, there is cause for concern over the medium to long
 term. Much as South Sudanese may want to distinguish
 themselves from the "Arab" north, the politics of the new
 state bear the stigma of the shared legacies of an undemo-
 cratic past. Overcoming these legacies will be no easy task. ■
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